I have actually been thinking the same thing lately. Never would have expected guys like Suarez, Lugo, and Houk to be the best pitchers in the league. Did you happen to look at this in terms of WAR/162 or WAR/Start rather than total WAR? Might help eliminate the effect of differing lengths of careers and/or outlier past seasons, and give a clearer comparison of the past versus the present. Really interesting topic though, thanks for writing!
Thanks Sean! I didn't look at that, but it would probably help at least boost some of the less experienced guys on the list. WAR/162 would also penalize 2020 players less -- everyone in this whole era is going to have their stats from an entire season knocked down because of the pandemic season. (Although, to be fair, 90s players also had that with the strike in 94-95. And 80s players had it with the 1981 split season, too.)
I’m starting to like WAR as a rate-stat better than a counting stat when judging a player’s ability. I think aggregate WAR really only has an advantage when comparing total production of players’ overall careers or entire seasons (when it makes sense to dock them for less playing time or injuries). When shear talent is of interest, I like rate-based WAR.
For sure. WAR is not really a forward-looking metric (although a multi-year, regressed, age-adjusted projected version of it does fine) as much as as it's a backwards-looking metric. So it's really intended for talking about accomplishments, production, contributions, etc. Stuff you've done, not stuff you WILL do.
The elevated age of these pitchers is certainly a curiosity. In Steve Jobs' famous Stanford commencement address (worth a read if you have not already), he noted that death is a crucial part of life because it clears out the old to make way for the new. Injuries in sports serve the same function. They force risk adverse front offices to look to younger and cheaper prospects earlier than they otherwise would and new stars are born from this invisible hand.
In this age of omnipresent arm injuries (see Houston's Javier and Urquidy today), it would seem that the churn, like that in life, would be greater and toward more youth - not less. But that seems for now not to be true. Why do we seem to have the older replacing the older? Why is age less of a change agent now than in years past?
Is that a function of earlier ages for TJS where there are fewer top prospects available at typical younger ages for an MLB debut? Is it a function of looking at a pitcher who has already had arm surgery as - real or imagined - embodying less risk than someone who has not? Is it a simple shortage of good young pitchers generally?
Beyond that, what this seems to suggest is that the traditional starter is quickly becoming an endangered species. This trend has of course been somewhat iterative, with the closer concept of a few years ago pushing the third time through the order penalty (TTOP) out for the second starter. The market has spoken in other ways too. Many now say that there is no longer such a thing as a "top pitching prospect" due to injuries, reduced usage and disappointing outcomes.
Still, this feels different not only from a supply standpoint with injuries, but also from a cost standpoint. Consider the total cost of Snell, Cole, Strider, Ohtani, Scherzer, Kershaw, Alcantara and others not pitching - it's mind boggling money and opportunity costs.
It feels like only a matter of time until someone decides to try what Bill James advocated for 45 years ago - and Tony LaRussa tried for a bit - a 3-3-3 rotation - where you have essentially three cheaper long relievers going for 3 innings (45-50 pitches) per game every fourth game. It can be modified to a 3-3-2-1 if you possess a great closer.
While James and LaRussa were both searching for a performance advantage from TTOP avoidance versus the (then) 7-1-1 rotation, today this makes more sense from a financial standpoint by driving down the cost of your increasingly injured and expensive pitching. This list seems to suggest that this approach is very appealing to a GM willing to blaze a trail.
What would be an interesting follow-up here is to look beyond age and prior performance and instead, track the dollars spent per WAR for the top 10 or 15. That sort of trend view over time can matter because if a front office can reduce the cost of its pitching and make replacements for the injured more fungible and less disruptive through a superior structure, they can invest more heavily on the more stable offensive side of the run differential equation.
From a risk standpoint, this sort of new rotation would reduce the concentration of pitching risk and the expense around the traditional starter paradigm. It makes a ton of sense...if anyone has the courage to try it.
I have actually been thinking the same thing lately. Never would have expected guys like Suarez, Lugo, and Houk to be the best pitchers in the league. Did you happen to look at this in terms of WAR/162 or WAR/Start rather than total WAR? Might help eliminate the effect of differing lengths of careers and/or outlier past seasons, and give a clearer comparison of the past versus the present. Really interesting topic though, thanks for writing!
Thanks Sean! I didn't look at that, but it would probably help at least boost some of the less experienced guys on the list. WAR/162 would also penalize 2020 players less -- everyone in this whole era is going to have their stats from an entire season knocked down because of the pandemic season. (Although, to be fair, 90s players also had that with the strike in 94-95. And 80s players had it with the 1981 split season, too.)
I’m starting to like WAR as a rate-stat better than a counting stat when judging a player’s ability. I think aggregate WAR really only has an advantage when comparing total production of players’ overall careers or entire seasons (when it makes sense to dock them for less playing time or injuries). When shear talent is of interest, I like rate-based WAR.
For sure. WAR is not really a forward-looking metric (although a multi-year, regressed, age-adjusted projected version of it does fine) as much as as it's a backwards-looking metric. So it's really intended for talking about accomplishments, production, contributions, etc. Stuff you've done, not stuff you WILL do.
The elevated age of these pitchers is certainly a curiosity. In Steve Jobs' famous Stanford commencement address (worth a read if you have not already), he noted that death is a crucial part of life because it clears out the old to make way for the new. Injuries in sports serve the same function. They force risk adverse front offices to look to younger and cheaper prospects earlier than they otherwise would and new stars are born from this invisible hand.
In this age of omnipresent arm injuries (see Houston's Javier and Urquidy today), it would seem that the churn, like that in life, would be greater and toward more youth - not less. But that seems for now not to be true. Why do we seem to have the older replacing the older? Why is age less of a change agent now than in years past?
Is that a function of earlier ages for TJS where there are fewer top prospects available at typical younger ages for an MLB debut? Is it a function of looking at a pitcher who has already had arm surgery as - real or imagined - embodying less risk than someone who has not? Is it a simple shortage of good young pitchers generally?
Beyond that, what this seems to suggest is that the traditional starter is quickly becoming an endangered species. This trend has of course been somewhat iterative, with the closer concept of a few years ago pushing the third time through the order penalty (TTOP) out for the second starter. The market has spoken in other ways too. Many now say that there is no longer such a thing as a "top pitching prospect" due to injuries, reduced usage and disappointing outcomes.
Still, this feels different not only from a supply standpoint with injuries, but also from a cost standpoint. Consider the total cost of Snell, Cole, Strider, Ohtani, Scherzer, Kershaw, Alcantara and others not pitching - it's mind boggling money and opportunity costs.
It feels like only a matter of time until someone decides to try what Bill James advocated for 45 years ago - and Tony LaRussa tried for a bit - a 3-3-3 rotation - where you have essentially three cheaper long relievers going for 3 innings (45-50 pitches) per game every fourth game. It can be modified to a 3-3-2-1 if you possess a great closer.
While James and LaRussa were both searching for a performance advantage from TTOP avoidance versus the (then) 7-1-1 rotation, today this makes more sense from a financial standpoint by driving down the cost of your increasingly injured and expensive pitching. This list seems to suggest that this approach is very appealing to a GM willing to blaze a trail.
What would be an interesting follow-up here is to look beyond age and prior performance and instead, track the dollars spent per WAR for the top 10 or 15. That sort of trend view over time can matter because if a front office can reduce the cost of its pitching and make replacements for the injured more fungible and less disruptive through a superior structure, they can invest more heavily on the more stable offensive side of the run differential equation.
From a risk standpoint, this sort of new rotation would reduce the concentration of pitching risk and the expense around the traditional starter paradigm. It makes a ton of sense...if anyone has the courage to try it.