I agree that the George signing does make the 76ers likely much better and an interesting story - despite eerie echoes of Harden to the Brooklyn Net in 2021 (which I also thought would make them better). However, every transaction has at least two components - talent and financial. It's this latter element that I have noticed a concerning trend in recent years across most sports.
Specifically, that due to the half-life of a General Manager being remarkably short these days, teams seem to be wildly overpaying for a handful productive remaining years spread out over a larger number of unproductive but guaranteed years on the back end. This is likely due to the realization that the front office needs to win now and will likely be gone in a few years even if they do. So, the future financial cleanup is left to some unknown GM to take care of.
You now regularly see guaranteed baseball deals stretching into the forties for a player who will likely be half of their value at that point. Trea Turner is but one example and Bryce Harper - an early adopter of this strategy - another. Harper, who has eight years remaining on his deal until well past peak age 39, attempted to negotiate an extension into his 40s so that he could ostensibly remain with Philadelphia "for life." Dombrowski politely declined, a tacit admission that the extremely popular and productive Harper's contract was already a suboptimal one for the Phillies.
This strategy has led to an increasing number of contracts that are far more expensive than simple AAV would suggest. As a result, I try to view these deals from the perspective of an Effective AAV where I take the number of likely remaining years of higher-level production and divide that by the total contract expense. In other words, at what future point in the contract term you would no longer be willing to pay the AAV for that player? Or, at what point would you love to have an opt out for the contract based on the aging curve? This will yield the Effective AAV.
The trend now is for teams to wildly pay more over time for a depreciating asset by pushing the excess costs and consequences to the back end into the future. This won't often end well for the team as those payment will eventually come due with consequences.
That's what worries me about the George deal. He'll be 35 during the postseason next year. While he had a good year last year, he does appear to be increasingly injured and declining a bit - not surprising for someone his age. So, let's assume he's got two season left where you would still sign him for $53MM...that makes an Effective AAV of $106MM for the two years that you really want his services given his likely production. That's expensive.
So yes, I see the Sixers as better for two years or so. However, the last two years of that contract could be brutal for Morey and the franchise. They're on the clock.
I agree that the George signing does make the 76ers likely much better and an interesting story - despite eerie echoes of Harden to the Brooklyn Net in 2021 (which I also thought would make them better). However, every transaction has at least two components - talent and financial. It's this latter element that I have noticed a concerning trend in recent years across most sports.
Specifically, that due to the half-life of a General Manager being remarkably short these days, teams seem to be wildly overpaying for a handful productive remaining years spread out over a larger number of unproductive but guaranteed years on the back end. This is likely due to the realization that the front office needs to win now and will likely be gone in a few years even if they do. So, the future financial cleanup is left to some unknown GM to take care of.
You now regularly see guaranteed baseball deals stretching into the forties for a player who will likely be half of their value at that point. Trea Turner is but one example and Bryce Harper - an early adopter of this strategy - another. Harper, who has eight years remaining on his deal until well past peak age 39, attempted to negotiate an extension into his 40s so that he could ostensibly remain with Philadelphia "for life." Dombrowski politely declined, a tacit admission that the extremely popular and productive Harper's contract was already a suboptimal one for the Phillies.
This strategy has led to an increasing number of contracts that are far more expensive than simple AAV would suggest. As a result, I try to view these deals from the perspective of an Effective AAV where I take the number of likely remaining years of higher-level production and divide that by the total contract expense. In other words, at what future point in the contract term you would no longer be willing to pay the AAV for that player? Or, at what point would you love to have an opt out for the contract based on the aging curve? This will yield the Effective AAV.
The trend now is for teams to wildly pay more over time for a depreciating asset by pushing the excess costs and consequences to the back end into the future. This won't often end well for the team as those payment will eventually come due with consequences.
That's what worries me about the George deal. He'll be 35 during the postseason next year. While he had a good year last year, he does appear to be increasingly injured and declining a bit - not surprising for someone his age. So, let's assume he's got two season left where you would still sign him for $53MM...that makes an Effective AAV of $106MM for the two years that you really want his services given his likely production. That's expensive.
So yes, I see the Sixers as better for two years or so. However, the last two years of that contract could be brutal for Morey and the franchise. They're on the clock.